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1. A Confusing Picture 
1 In “Things and Their Place in Theories,” Quine labels himself as “a robust realist” for
his “unswerving belief in external things – people, nerve endings, sticks, stones” as well
as “atoms and electrons and […] classes,” in connection with his naturalism and his
conception  of  science  (Quine  1981:  21).  According  to  this  picture,  being  a  “realist”
means having a certain belief in the nature of the kinds of entities we are assuming,
such as physical objects or abstract entities; and it is Quine’s “unswerving belief” what
makes his realism “robust.” Curiously enough, both his conception of entities, physical
or abstract, and his naturalistic conception of science granted Quine the label of “anti-
realist.” According to Peter Hylton, for instance,  in Quine’s philosophy “there is no
more  to  an  object  than  its  role  in  the theory,”  and  “we  can  systematically  switch
objects from role to role. The result is ontological relativity. […] The possibility of this
sort of switching, if granted, seems to undermine realism by indicating that we do not
really know what we are being realistic about; we feel as if we are in the odd position of
insisting that  something must  exist  but  having to acknowledge that  we cannot say
what”  (Hylton  2004:  144).  Again,  according  to  Hylton,  being  an  “antirealist”  means 
having a certain belief  in the nature of  the kinds of  entities  we are assuming.  The
situation gets even more confused when we recall that, notwithstanding the “robust
realism”  Quine  ascribed  to  himself,  he  was  criticized  by  Armstrong  (1980)  for  his
antirealistic rejection of universals, for instance through the refusal of an ontological
commitment  to  predicates.  According  to  Armstrong,  Quine  is  giving  to  predicates
“what has been said to be the privilege of the harlot: power without responsibility. The
predicate is informative, it makes a vital contribution to telling us what is the case, the
world is different if it is different, yet ontologically it is supposed not to commit us.
Nice  work:  if  you  can  get  it”  (Armstrong  1980:  443).  Armstrong  in  turn  describes
himself  as  a  realist  thanks to  his  Platonic  belief  in  the existence of  universals,  but
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Armstrong  himself  has  been  considered  an  “anti-realist”  (in  ontology,  or  perhaps
metaphysics)  for  his  rejection  of  Platonic  uninstantiated  universals.  This  gets  all
messed up, when we consider that, according to the literature, being a Platonist means
being a realist in ontology (and perhaps in metaphysics) and that Platonism (together
with all its Idealistic reworked versions) is considered the most paradigmatic version of
the rejection of realism (taken as anti-idealism).
 
2. A Meta-Philosophical Approach
2 One of the complications of a clear evaluation of different positions in metaphysics and
ontology  is  discrepancy  in  terminology  and  variance,  if  not  incongruity,  of  basic
concepts associated to relevant notions. This is a common problem in philosophy, but it
seems  that  it  has  been  exacerbated  in  recent  debates  about  different  clusters  of
positions called “realism.” The topic of realism and anti-realism is clearly central in
many  contemporary  debates,  especially  in  pragmatism  and  neo-pragmatism  and
American philosophy in  general  (e.g.,  Peirce,  Sellars,  Dummett,  Putnam,  …),  not  to
mention ontology, philosophy of mathematics (Platonism, fictionalism, …) and so on.
Evidently, a significant reconstruction of the various systems (not even of the most
important authors) and the many possible foundations and justifications of “realism” is
out  of  the  scope  of  this  paper  (a  well-done  comprehensive  synopsis  of  versions  of
“realism” can be easily found in several  other papers and encyclopedia entries,  for
instance  Miller  2019).  Instead  of  trying  to  infer  a  definition  of  “realism,”  as  if  by
induction, from the countless pictures given by philosophers identifying (or identified
by others) as “realists” in the history of philosophy or in a catalogue of current debates,
here I offer a taxonomy provided by a conceptual analysis of the notion of “realism” in
what I think are its sub-concepts, recognizing three different conceptual frameworks.
3 The assessment of the notion I am trying to carry out here will be strictly delimited and
essentially framed within the bounds of conceptual analysis, will be meta-philosophical
in essence, and will not engage in a presentation of what I may judge are the most
relevant philosophical positions nor will it engage in a discussion or an evaluation of
the best arguments for or against a particular philosophical version of what is called
“realism.” 
 
3. How not to Confuse Three Different Kinds of
Confusion 
4 Philosophers and historians of philosophy tend to assume that they have an intuitive
grasp on the notion of realism and on what they mean when they label some other
philosophers, or themselves, as realist. Unfortunately, when we try to spell out the basic
intuition inherent in this concept, we meet a significant variance in the core meaning.
Such  a  variance  in  the  concept  of  “realism”  can  be  understood  in  (at  least)  three
different ways, the first two of which are not directly my focus here (even though they
can still play a secondary role at the level with which I am concerned). 
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Three kinds of variance in “realism”
5 Firstly,  the  confusion  in  terminology  can  be  trivially  connected  with  the  fact  that
philosophers  may  request  different  sets  of  conditions  in  order  for  a  philosophical
position to be acknowledged as actual “realism” or a good version of realism. In this first
sense,  it  seems  that  the  variation  in  the  meaning  associated  with  the  concept  of
“realism” is a variation among different realist philosophical systems. The clearest way
we  encounter  this  variance  is  in  the  diachronical  consideration  of  philosophy:  for
instance, when we realize that the “realism,” let us say, Nicolai Hartmann had in mind
was obviously different than the “realism” Herbart defended. This seems related to the
difference  of  philosophical  theories  rather  than  a  stratification  of  different  core
meanings associated to the very concept  of  “realism.” The clarification required to
explicate  the  different  meanings  of  Hartmann’s  realism  and  Herbart’s  realism  is  a
clarification of their philosophical theories rather than a conceptual analysis of the
notion of realism as such. I call this divergence the philosophical variance in the meaning
of  realism (PVR),  as  it  involves  different  conceptions  of  realism  as  a  whole
philosophical system.
6 The second one is the contrast among the set of conditions requested to be a realist of
the correct kind, which can be expanded, modified or contracted according, again, to the
choice of a particular conception, and perhaps to a particular philosophical “taste,”
with no need to recall a whole philosophical system as in PVR. For instance, we may
distinguish an “external  realism,”  an “internal  realism,”  or  a  “naïve  realism.”  This
doesn’t recap the whole philosophy of a particular thinker or a particular philosophical
school, as it is the case with “Herbart’s Realism” or “Marx’ Realism” and gets closer to a
general definition (or, it seems, a cluster of different definitions) of what is considered
essential to be a realist. Still it requires a proper version of realism as opposed to other,
less satisfactory versions of weaker realism. I call this divergence the variance in strength
in the meaning of realism (SVR), as it distributes kinds of realism on a scale and picks
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the correct version of realism assigning the label of actual realism to a certain point in
the series. 
7 The third sense of the variance that I have in mind does not involve the request of
actuality, as in the previous two cases. This is why I think it is connected at a deeper
level to the core meaning of the very notion of “realism” rather than the particular,
better or worse, form of a philosophical version of realism. This third sense can be, for
instance, clarified in connection to the correlated concepts we associate to the notion
of “realism” and it seems linked to the particular framework in which we are using the
notion. For instance, in ontology we contrast being a realist with being an antirealist (or
a nihilist) while in epistemology we tend to contrast being a realist with being an idealist.
I  call this divergence in the meaning of realism the variance in conceptual frameworks
(CVR), as it involves different roles of the notion of “realism” in different theoretical
contexts.
8 It is the clarification of CVR that is my focus here, but I may still use PVR and SVR
(mainly,  by  contrast)  in  order  to  get  my results.  There  have  obviously  been many
attempts  at  a  clarification  of  the  notion  in  realism  but  contributions  are  usually
devoted to illustrating a particular philosophical stance in the philosophical arena, in
the sense of PVR and SVR, or to offering a defense of (or an attack to) a particular
version of realism rather than clarifying the variance of the core notions implied in
different usages, as in CVR.
9 Puzzlingly,  exploiting  the  variance  in  the  third  sense  can be  a  philosophical  tool,
wittingly or not, in order to show the weakness of the philosophical notions we want to
discredit  or  to  attempt  an  objective  evaluation of  the  costs and  benefits  of  a
philosophical theory. Nonetheless, the clarification required in CVR does not, as such,
need to  be  connected to  one form or  another  of  the  philosophical  positions  called
“realism.”
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A conceptual map of “realism”
 
4. Toward a Taxonomy for CVR
10 Some attempts at recommending a taxonomy for realism are available in the literature,
usually to articulate different forms of “scientific realism” (e.g. Putnam 1982; Horwich
1982; Merrill 1980), but with significant differences. Given that my approach here is
completely alternative, I will not discuss those taxonomies here.
11 It is common to distinguish three forms of realism, and my proposal here also assumes
three kinds of realism.
12 1) Most of the conceptions that we are used to call “realist” fall under the category of
what  I  call  “realism  in  epistemology”  or  “epistemological  realism”  (ER).  The  basic
assumption of ER consists in the theses that i) which and how many entities exist and
which and how many (relevant) properties they exhibit is independent from the activity
of a cognitive agent or a conceptual scheme or the logical structure of a language and
the ideology of a certain theory, and ii) our knowledge consists of adequately capturing
or mirroring such independent reality. In this sense for instance, Kant is not a realist. 
13 2)  A  completely  different  notion  of  realism  (sadly,  sometimes  confused  with  the
previous  one)  is  “realism  in  ontology”  or  “ontological  realism”  (OR).  The  basic
assumption of OR consists in the thesis that a certain kind of entity (or certain kinds of
entities) is (are) to be considered existent and counted in our inventory of the world. In
this sense, for instance, Kant is a realist about mathematical objects, since they are, as
objects,  on a  par with any other object,  empirical  or  not,  and they are constituted
thanks to the correct application of the set of a priori concepts to the pure intuitions of
space and time. And according to Kant,  there is  no other meaningful way to be an
object; therefore, mathematical objects are legitimately included in our inventory of
kinds of entities.
14 3) A third notion, one that requires more subtle notions to be distinguished from the
previous two is “realism in metaphysics” or “metaphysical realism” (MR). According to
MR, being realist does not involve the question whether some entities exist, but how 
they exist. In general, in any form of realism in the sense of MR, the notion of “reality”
is assumed to play an essential role in metaphysical explanations. It may sound that MR
can be reduced to  ER,  since we may offer  a  picture of  MR according to  which,  for
instance,  truth  consists  in  a  correspondence  relationship  between  our  assertions/
theories,  on  one  side,  and  reality  at  some  fundamental  level,  on  the  other  side.
Nonetheless, one can be realist in the sense of MR, which is a thesis about truth and the
actual nature of reality at a deep level, and still not be a realist in the sense of ER, which
is  a  thesis  about  knowledge,  if  one  assumes  a  discrepancy  between  our  cognitive
abilities  and  reality  as  it  is  metaphysically.  For  instance,  one  may  assume  that
knowledge does not adequately capture or mirror reality as it is, or that doesn’t reach
the  fundamental  level  of  reality.  In  this  sense,  a  philosopher  following  Quine’s
approach  to  ontological  questions  as  quantificational  questions  or  assuming  a
(neo-)Carnapian approach to questions of existence, is not a realist, as she wouldn’t
assume any notion of “reality” in assigning the existence to a class of entities required
by our sentences (saying for instance that “universals and properties exist” does not
involve the notion of reality). Again, in this sense, a philosopher following Kant, who is
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not  to  be  considered  an  ER  realist  and  is  to  be  considered  an  OR  realist,  can  be
considered a MR realist if she stresses the relevance of the category of “reality,” which
is a pure concept of our understanding and it is essential to constitute the experience
in  the  form  we  can  have  it.  Protesting that  “reality”  is  now  a  category  of  the
understanding does not invalidate the metaphysical essential role of this notion, but
just stresses the epistemological role of the cognitive agent in building our experience
and our knowledge (invalidating ER and not MR, but ER wasn’t assumed anyway from
the very beginning). Actually, the same philosopher will not be considered a MR realist
if  she  assumes  a  notion  of  truth  as  pure  internal  coherence  without  any  form  of
correspondence to a reality, let’s say in some version of Pure Idealism. However we
decide to characterize this philosopher, based on the particular form of Kantianism she
decides to adopt, it should be clear that being or not a realist in the sense of MR does
not involve any revision of our classification of her as a realist in the sense of ER or OR.
15 To sum up the variances between different notions of realism in different conceptual
frameworks,  I  find  it  useful  to  recall  the  opposition  between  Plato  and  Aristotle.
Aristotle  is  commonly  contrasted  with  Plato  in  terms  of  realism  and  antirealism.
Clearly, this cannot be in the framework of MR: both Plato and Aristotle are MR realists
since they share the typical  classical  Greek stand in metaphysics that wasn’t  really
challenged  until  the  epistemological  doubt  of  modern  times  and  which  assumes  a
fundamentally natural correspondence between episteme and reality as it  is.  We can
more accurately state their difference articulating it in terms of ER, and more precisely
in terms of the notion of “independence” that we used in the definition of ER: Plato
assumes that  ordinary objects  of  our  empirical  knowledge are  dependent  on Ideas,
while Aristotle denies this dependence. What is interesting is that, in terms of OR, for
instance regarding abstract objects, it is Plato who is the OR realist (abstract objects
exist  regardless  of  their  exemplifications)  and  Aristotle  who  is  the  OR  antirealist
(abstract objects exist exclusively in virtue of individuals that exemplify them). 
 
5. Local and Global Realism
16 Philosophers speak in terms of local and global realism meaning that someone may be a
realist in a particular area (e.g. realist about ethics) or kinds of entities (for instance,
realist about numbers) or a realist in a more comprehensive sense (see, for instance,
Valore 2016, ch. 2). This distinction intersects the previous taxonomy.
17 ER and MR can be sustained locally or globally.  For instance,  we can be radical  ER
realists and assume that anything we know represents an independent reality. Or else,
we  can  locally  be  ER  realists  distinguishing  sectors  of  knowledge  with  different
epistemological qualities.  Again, we can be radical MR realists and assume that any
notion of truth must conform to a correspondence to a notion of reality metaphysically
charged. Or else, we can be locally MR realists, assuming this view stands just at some
level  of  reality,  for  instance  at  the  fundamental  level  of  atoms and void  if  we  are
atomistic in the sense of Democritus but not at the level of ordinary objects. Still, some
philosophers may disagree, as for them it may be difficult to accept the idea that truth
is not defined independently from the contexts of utterance.
18 On the other hand, it is difficult to make sense of a global anti-realism in the sense of
OR. An ontological realist grants existence to a certain kind of entities, meaning that
they are not reducible, i.e.  they are not dispensable. Some entities, however scarce,
A Proposed Taxonomy of Realism in Conceptual Frameworks
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XIII-1 | 2021
6
must be acknowledged (let us say, at least the Self, if you are a solipsistic idealist). The
only possibility for a global antirealism in OR seems the rejection of any ontological
claim,  deflating  ontology  and/or  disposing  it  as  meaningless.  However,  even  the
universal  rejection  of  any  realism  in  the  sense  of  OR shouldn’t  count  as  an  OR
antirealistic position, i.e. for a positive eliminativist claim. This is, for instance, clear
for a Neo-Carnapian approach, such as the one in Hirsch 2009: he takes for granted that
“the world and the things in it exist for the most part in complete independence of our
knowledge or language” (ibid.: 232) assigning to himself the label of realist (in my sense
of ER); but he denies that ontological disputes are anything more than merely verbal
disputes, being in this neither a realist nor an antirealist (in my sense of OR). The global
rejection of realism in the case of OR could more properly be labelled as meta-ontological
antirealism.  In general,  it  may be useful  to  recall  that  the notion of  realism we are
dealing with here is  located at  the level  of  the  first  order  debate,  whether  certain
entities exist, and not at the meta-theoretical level, whether the question about certain
entities is meaningful (more on this in Tahko 2015; Valore 2018). For instance, Carnap
and Quine may share the same local ontology but disagree at the metaontological level.
Therefore,  characterizations  of  OR  offered  in  terms  of  meaningfulness  of  ontology
(“Ontological Facts are Objective,” or “Ontological Disputes Are Serious,” see Jenkins
2010) or the rejection of quantifier variance (“Ontological Best Quantifier Meaning,”
again  in  Jenkins  2010)  should  be  rejected  here,  as  clearly  expressed  at  the  meta-
theoretical level. This is also the case for the characterization of OR provided in Sider
2009,  according to which ontological  realism amounts exactly  to univocalism about
quantification.
19 Taking the notion of a global OR antirealistic position off the table, can we make sense
of a global OR realism? Notwithstanding Quine’s joke at the beginning of Quine 1948,
nobody really answers the question about what is there saying “everything,” at least
not  if  this  means  that  we are  never  excluding anything at  all  from our  inventory.
Excluding both global  antirealism and global  realism, we can conclude that any OR
realism is a form of local realism and any OR antirealism a form of local antirealism.
Philosophers are typically OR realists and OR antirealists at the same time regarding
different kinds of entities (for instance, a common position among philosophers is to be
realists  regarding  ordinary  objects  and  antirealists  about  fictional  characters,  or
realists regarding existent objects and antirealists about non-existent or mere possible
objects).
 
6. CVR and Metaphysical Grounding
20 Galimberti 2019 was kind enough to discuss my proposal, interestingly connecting it to
the recent debate about metaphysical grounding. In general, any philosopher working
within the  grounding paradigm is  a  MR realist,  since  the main point  of  grounding
theory is to vindicate a metaphysically charged notion of reality. Galimberti wonders
whether a grounding theorist is necessarily an ER realist, deciding that it’s not the case:
for instance, Jonathan Schaffer seems to be, Kit Fine seems not to be. 
21 In the case of Schaffer, the taxonomy provided for CVR may help in stating his position
about fundamentality. Schaffer 2009 holds an OR permissivist position: many things
like numbers, universals, fictional characters exist., leaving open the question of how
they exist. 
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22 Fine holds a different position about ER. Even though considerations of grounding are
relevant for the question of realism, Fine does not consider the notion of grounding
necessarily  involved  with  a  particular  realist  view.  According  to  Fine  2001  the
metaphysical dependence relationship that the notion of grounding expresses can be
assumed without further commitments in terms of independence from theories and
languages: the dependence relationship may hold between worldly facts and entities or
merely within a  language between statements  and propositions.  This  conception of
grounding keeps the question of realism, in the sense of ER, open.
23 I  am myself convinced that the taxonomy here provided is expressive enough for a
fine-grained  articulation  of  different  philosophical  positions  in  the  recent  debate,
including the question of metaphysical grounding, without the need to be judgmental
about what an actual or genuine form should be. Being this tool meta-philosophical by
its own nature, I strongly hold its non-judgmental character a theoretical value. 
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ABSTRACTS
One  of  the  complications  of  a  clear  evaluation  of  different  positions  called  “realism”  in
metaphysics and ontology is discrepancy in terminology and variance of basic intuitions inherent
this notion. I recommend a taxonomy that distinguishes three kinds of variance: variance in the
sets of conditions for a philosophical position to be acknowledged as actual realism, variance in
strength and variance in conceptual frameworks. Within this last case, I propose to differentiate
realism in epistemology, in ontology, and in metaphysics, intersecting these three variants with
the  local/global  realism  dichotomy.  The  taxonomy  here  provided  aims  at  being  meta-
philosophical;  expressive  enough  for  a  fine-grained  articulation  of  different  philosophical
positions in the recent debate, including the question of metaphysical grounding; and impartial,
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